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ARGUMENT 
THE REPC WAS NOT RESCINDED BUT RATHER NOT PERFORMED BY 
PLAINTIFFS, AND DEFENDANTS, HAVING SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS' EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE REPC, ARE 
ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THEIR FEES AND COSTS. 
"*If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded in 
accordance with the terms of th[e] contract.'" Panos v. Olsen & 
Assoc. Constr., Inc., 123 P.3d 816, 822 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) 
(quoting Foster v. Montgomery, 82 P. 3d 191, 194 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003)). In the present controversy, the attorney fee provision of 
the contract states: "In the event of litigation . . . to enforce 
this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and 
reasonable attorney fees." REPC 1 17, Br. of Appellees, Addendum I. 
Unquestionably, by the terms of the contract, Defendants, having 
prevailed,1 are "entitled'' to reimbursement. 
To try to avert paying fees, Plaintiffs cite a succession of 
rescission cases, Pis.' Reply. Br. at 23, including BLT Investment 
I 
Though the Proposed Lease was the primary focus of Plaintiffs' 
lawsuit, Plaintiffs also sued Defendants to enforce the REPC under 
a fraud theory, Second Am. Compl. SI5 32-38, R. 467-73, which was 
rejected by the trial court and which Plaintiffs do not address on 
appeal. Thus, Plaintiffs instituted litigation to enforce the REPC 
and Defendants prevailed. Following summary judgment, Plaintiffs 
sought to amend their complaint to allege new theories to support 
enforcement of the REPC. Again, Defendants were required to defend 
against these efforts and prevailed, as the trial court rejected 
Plaintiffs' post-judgment attempt to amend, R. 779, Br. of 
Appellees, Addendum F. Finally, while Plaintiffs did not bring 
their fraud theory before this Court, they continue to advance 
theories introduced post-summary judgment to support enforcement of 
the REPC, entitling Defendants to their fees before this Court. 
Panos, 123 P.3d at 822. 
1 
Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978), Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2005 
UT App 522 (unpublished decision), and Chase v. Scott, 38 P. 3d 1001 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001). Those case are not applicable to this case, 
however, because the REPC was not rescinded in this case. It was 
not performed by Plaintiffs. The closing date passed without tender 
and the REPC expired by its terms. 
More analogous to the instant case than the rescission 
authorities are Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), and Lee v. Barnes, 977 P.2d 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), 
both of which were decided subsequent to Snow and its annunciation 
of the rescission rule. 
As noted in Defendants' initial brief, there are many 
similarities between this case and Carr, including that the buyers 
in both cases sent belated letters to the sellers informing them of 
a willingness to tender without providing the actual funds and that 
the buyers in both instances "never actually obtained the loanfs] 
necessary . . . to fulfill . . . [their] contractual 
obligation[s] and [to] enable [the]m to make a proper tender of . 
. . [their] performance." Carr, 781 P.2d at 1294. 
Significantly, given these facts and the paucity of evidence 
that tender would not have been accepted if made in a timely 
manner, this Court concluded that "Carr's duty to tender was 
neither performed nor excused. . . . [and] that he was not entitled 
2 
to prevail in th[e] action." Id. at 1295. As to the issue of 
attorney fees, the Court advised: 
Smith took an entirely defensive posture. It was not 
enforcing any right arising under the agreement or 
arising from a breach thereof. On the contrary, its 
position at trial was that there was no viable contract 
left to enforce. While Smith would surely be entitled to 
attorney fees under the more typical provision awarding 
fees to the prevailing party, it is not entitled to 
attorney fees under the provision at issue. 
Id. at 1296 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
While Carr accords with the instant case in many ways, perhaps 
the one crucial distinction between the two cases is that the fee 
provision now at issue is indisputably "the . . . typical provision 
awarding fees to the prevailing party." Id. Hence, Carr indicates 
that Defendants are entitled to their fees. 
This conclusion is also bolstered by Lee, 977 P.2d at 551, in 
which the Court upheld an award of attorney fees under 
circumstances resembling those at hand. The parties in the matter 
entered into a purchase contract for a parcel of property in 
Tremonton. Xd. The contract set a " [s]ettlement [djeadline . . . of 
xApril 30 - 97.'" Id. "April 30, 1997 passed, and the sale was not 
closed." Ld. at 552. Nevertheless, in June of that year, the buyer 
scheduled a closing which the sellers did not attend. JEd. Rather, 
the sellers argued that "the [cjontract had expired," id., and 
later obtained summary judgment on the basis "that they had no 
obligation under the [c]ontract because the closing did not occur 
on or before April 30, 1997." Id. 
3 
Noting that "[t]he [c]ontract contain[ed] an integration 
clause," jLd., and that it could " [ ] not be changed except by written 
agreement," id., the Court "determined [that] the [c]ontract 
unambiguously required a closing date of April 30, 1997," icl. at 
553, and affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the sellers. 
(As noted in Defendants' initial brief, at 25, the REPC in this 
case also required any alteration of the contract to be in writing. 
REPC, 1 14, Br. of Appellees, Addendum I.) The Court then proceeded 
to the issue of attorney fees. 
Citing an attorney fees provision identical to the one that is 
the subject of this litigation, Lee, 977 P.2d at 553, the sellers 
"assert[ed] that under the [c]ontract they [we]re entitled to fees 
for successfully defending." Xd. This Court "agree[d]." .Id. In 
short, the Court granted attorney fees on a "[c]ontract [that] had 
expired." I_cl. at 552. In the present case, Plaintiffs herein 
brought an action on an expired contract, requiring Defendants to 
defend. 
Neither Defendants nor Plaintiffs (in this case) sought 
rescission, nor did the trial court order rescission.2 In granting 
2 
In Snow, 586 P.2d at 458, the Utah Supreme Court relied on 
authority from the Oregon Supreme Court for the rescission rule. 
Though Oregon still adheres to the rule, Bennett v. Bauqh, 329 Or. 
282, 286 (1999) it is noteworthy that the Oregon Supreme Court 
upheld an award of fees where "[d]efendants raised 
affirmative defenses . . . [of] estoppel, undue influence, and 
rescission," idL at 285, but where the "judgment[, though rendered 
in favor of the defendants,] d[id] not declare that the parties' 
contract was rescinded." id. at 286. Distilling the decision, the 
4 
summary judgment, the court concluded "that the date for settlement 
under the REPC passed without full performance by either party," R. 
508, January 11, 2006 Order at 3, Br. of Appellees, Addendum C, and 
that "[i]t appear[ed] that after Plaintiffs encountered difficulty 
obtaining . . . conventional financing . . . , the REPC was 
abandoned by both parties." Id. This casef therefore, is more akin 
to Carr and Lee than Snow. In Snow, "the trial court ordered 
rescission," 586 P.2d at 457, stating that "under the facts of 
th[e] case the execution of a mutually acceptable escrow agreement 
was essentially made a condition to the preliminary agreement." Id. 
at 458. 
In contrast to the Snow parties, Plaintiffs and Defendants did 
come to a consensus, on all material issues, which they 
memorialized in the REPC. However, the purpose of the contract was 
not accomplished due to nonperformance by Plaintiffs. As in Lee, 
the settlement deadline passed without the submission of the 
purchase price. 977 P.2d at 551. Additionally, as in Carr, there 
was no timely tender of the purchase price, 781 P.2d at 1295-96, 
and "[n]o loan was ever approved [for the purchase]," i_d. at 1293, 
though obtaining a loan "was a condition precedent." Id. 
Oregon Court of Appeals wrote: "[T]he Supreme Court held that 
defendants are entitled to attorney fees because, although the 
trial court entered judgment for defendants, the judgment did not 
expressly order rescission of the parties' contract." Bennett v. 
Bauqh, 164 Or. App. 243, 246 (1999) (emphasis added). 
5 
In short, Plaintiffs attempted to enforce the REPC on the 
basis of a fraud theory, rejected on summary judgment and not 
contested on appeal. Plaintiffs then asserted other theories 
following the judgment, and they now invite this Court to overrule 
the trial's court's decision denying their endeavor to amend their 
complaint for a third time. Defendants implore the Court to award 
Defendants their attorney fees according to the terms of REPC, 
where Plaintiffs brought suit based in part on the contract and 
sought to enforce the expired REPC. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request 
that the Court reverse the trial court's decision denying attorney 
fees to Defendants, and that the case be remanded with direction to 
award Defendants the attorney fees and costs incurred before the 
trial court and on appeal. 
Dated this ^ji day of January 2007. 
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